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attorneys in other jurisdictions, owe duties to third-party opinion letter recipients.
Appellants Richard A. Riley ("Riley"), Robert M. Turnbow/Sharon Cumming, P.R. of
the Turnbow Estate ("'Turnbow") and Eberle Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen ("Eberle")
prepared and delivered a third-party closing opinion letter to Reed Taylor ("Taylor") inviting
him to rely upon it, at the direction of AlA Services Corp. ("AlA"). After Judge Brudie ruled on
June 17, 2009 that the stock redemption agreement was illegal and unenforceable, Taylor filed
this present case against Riley, Turnbow and Eberle. The district court ruled below that "Riley
and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a non-client, to draft the opinion letter in a no(nJ-negligent
fashion." Riley agreed: "I think that in Judge Greenwood's opinion he stated very well what the
duties of an opinion giver are." This Court should af1irm in all material respects on the correct
theories through which duties are owed and reserve an award of fees to Taylor for remand.

n. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to LA.R. 35(b)(3), Taylor objects to Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's Statements of
the Case and corrects many of the inaccuracies or omissions in the argument section below.!
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle provided Taylor a third-party opinion letter, which is attached
as Appendix A. (R 824-28.) When Riley, Turnbow and Eberle renewed their motion for
summary judgment, Taylor had Professor Richard T. McDermott, professor of corporate law at
I Taylor moved to augment the record contemporaneously with filing this brief. The augmented documents
are numbered 2688 through 3436 and Taylor's citation of"R" includes the record and augmented record.
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at

. II, p. 1 17.)

Should this Court affirm Judge Greenwood on the correct legal theories or
I.
because his errors, if any, were harmless?
2.
Should this Court decide issues which were never asserted below and/or that
exceed the scope of the questions presented and answered by Judge Greenwood?
3.

rlave

4.

Should this Court award Taylor attorneys' fees and costs on appeal?

submit

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle waived certain issues on appeal for failing to
and authority, and are they judicially estopped from asserting resjudicata?

IV. ARGUMENT
On a permissive appeal, this Court is "constrained to rule narrowly and address only the
precise question that was fi'amed by the motion and answered by the trial cOUli." Rountree v.

Boise Baseball, LLC, 154 Idaho 167,

296 P.3d 373, 376 (2013) (citation omitted). The party

asserting a defense bears "the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact
material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker andAssocs., 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct.
App. 1994). The non-moving party receives all favorable evidentiary constructions and all
reasonable inferences. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 566 (1999);

Rawson v. United Steelworkers of Am., III Idaho 630, 726 P.2d 742 (1986). "Findings of fact
and conclusions of law are unnecessary ... [for] decisions on motions under Rules 12 or 56."
LR.C.P. 52. "Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court
will affirm the order on the correct theory." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho
2

p
to

.. on an
40}. 409,

" Idaho

V.

Teton

" 152 Idaho

P.3d 373 (2011). "A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or

argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292
P.3d 248 (2012) (citation omitted). "[AJn appellant can only appeal if the claimed error affected
a substantial right" and issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. !d.

"Whether a duty exists is a question of law, 'over which this Court exercises free
review.'" Rountree, 296 P.3d at 377 (citation omitted). "[A]n assumed duty ... results from a
voluntary undertaking" and the determination of such a duty is a question of fact. Jones v. Runft,
Leroy, OJ/lin & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 611-12, 873 P.2d 861 (1994).

1. Judge Greenwood Correctly Ruled that the Appellants Owe Duties to Taylor.
Judge Greenwood conectly ruled that "Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a nonclient,2 to draft the opinion letter in a no[nJ-negligent fashion" and that "[t]he lawyer issuing the
letter is specifically aware of the reliance by the non-client." (R 1684, 2569; App. A) Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle assert, without citing any authority to support their positions, that no duties
were owed to Taylor. (Riley Br. at 38-40; Eberle Br. at 13-18.)
Judge Greenwood has ruled twice that the duties owed to Taylor are consistent with
Harrigfeld v. JD. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). (R 1684, 2567-69.) Riley,
2 Riley, Turnbow and Eberle are estopped from asserting lack of privity with Taylor. Crossland Savings
Bank FSB v. Rockwood Insurance Company, 700 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
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are

to (

)

provide

why that test

or

not apply; and,

deny

voluntarily assumed a duties to Taylor. They also fail to address any of elements of the

IIarrigleld balance-of-the-harms test or deny that they assumed duties to Taylor. (R 1814-18,
1888-89, 2446-50, 2528, 3409-13.) Their arguments fail and they have waived duty issue.
It is well-settled that "[gJenerally speaking, '[ eJvery person, in the conduct of his business,

has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to
others.'" Rountree, 296 P.3d at 377 (citation omitted). "A voluntary duty is distinct from any
other duty a pmiy may have as a result of an undertaking or relationship." Jones, 125 Idaho at
611-12. In addition, "[aJn attorney's duty arises out of the contract between the attorney and his
or her client." Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 137.
Here, Turnbow and Eberle admit "through [their] then affiliation with Riley, [were]
involved in the drafting and delivery of an Opinion letter addressed to [Taylor] which was
delivered at closing of the redemption transaction at the direction of ALA." (R 72
824-28, 1784-85

~1O,

~10,

96-97

~1O,

2960, 3017, p. 5; App. A.) Riley admitted that he "participated in the

drafting and delivery of an opinion letter addressed to [Taylor] which was delivered at closing of
the redemption transaction .. .in satisfaction of a condition precedent to [Taylor's] obligation to
close the transaction." (R 54

~~10-1l,

824-28; App. A.) Riley also admitted that Eberle Berlin

was engaged ... at the request of AlA, to render certain opinions concerning the transaction." (R
2960.) Thus, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle either owed duties to Taylor under Harrigfeld or

4

owe
only
needed 10

LR.C.P.

(R. 898-99, 1

1694, 2446-50, 2570.) The

oCthe correct legal theory(ics) through which duties arc owcd is properly before this Court.
Judge Greenwood correctly ruled that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle owed duties to Taylor
based on Ilarrigfeld. (R 1685, 2567-70.) [n extending a duty beyond the scope previously
imposed. this Court engages in a balance-of-the-harms test. HarriKleld, 140 Idaho at 138. Even
after Judge Greenwood relied on JIarriKleld in his decisions, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle do not
address any of the elements of the balancc-of-the-harms test on appeaL (R 1685,2567-70.)
In f farrigfetd, this Court held that attorneys preparing testamentary instruments owe
duties to the named beneficiaries and if that testator's intent, as expressed in the instruments, is
frustrated and the beneficiary'S interest in the estate "is either lost, diminished, or unrealized, the
attorney would be liable to the non-client beneficiary." Harrigield, 140 Idaho at 138. This Court
explained that one of the main purposes of testamentary instruments is to transfer property to the
persons named in the instruments, so harm to those persons is "clearly foreseeable." !d. This
Court found that there is sufficient moral blame when an attorney negligently prepares the
instruments and imposing a duty creates an incentive for attorneys to "prepare such instruments
carefully because otherwise there would be no liability for the negligent drafting of such
instruments." !d. Finally, this Court found that extending a duty would "not unduly increase the
burden upon attorneys" because "insurance is readily available to cover such risk." Id.
Here, Riley and Turnbow drafted the instruments intended to transfer propeliy to Taylor

5

went a
to

(R

App.

). Thus, Taylor does not

to extend

Harrigleld, but rather to simply apply it to circumstances in this case, which is precisely what
Judge Greenwood did. In both of his decisions, Judge Greenwood broadly denied the motions for
summary judgment as to Taylor's malpractice claim.-) (R 1694,2570.) When Judge Greenwood
denied the renewed summary judgment motions, he ruled that he adhered to his prior decision.
(R 2569.) In his earlier decision, Judge Greenwood explicitly relied on Harrigleld:
The opinion letter authored by Riley and Turnbow as part of that work was
addressed to Taylor, specifically provided that it was for Taylor's benetit, and
acknowledged that he would rely on it. .. Riley and Turnbow argue strenuously that
there was no attorney client relationship and therefore no duty was owed to Taylor.
Defendants are partly right. There is no attorney client relationship. That does not
necessarily mean there was no duty .
.. . Although this precise issue has not been addressed by Idaho courts, the holding
of cases such as Prudential, supra, are consistent with the reasoning of our
Supreme COUli in Harrigleld .. .Riley and Turnbow had a duty to Taylor, a nonclient, to draft the opinion letter in a no[ n]-negligent fashion. That is, to exercise
the ordinary care, skill and prudence of a lawyer under the circumstances.
(R 1684.) When Riley, Turnbow and Eberle renewed their motion for summary judgment after
the stay was lifted, Judge Greenwood again relied upon Harrigfeld to support his decision:
The general rule of no liability to a non-client as announced in Herrigfeld is based
in a large part on the notion that the scope of duty owed by the attorney is defined
by the contract between the attorney and client as to what is being lmdertaken.
This is bolstered by the strong policy that the attorney should be free to give
3 Turnbow and Eberle's argument that Judge Greenwood "failed to engage in a balancing-of-the-harms
test" is misplaced, as he was only required to deny the motion for summary judgment. LR.C.P. 52; Eberle's Br. at
18. Even if the argument was well taken, it would only be hannless error since that test was satisfied here. LR.C.P.
61. Taylor submitted argument that all of the elements were present, which was not disputed below. (R 2449-50.)

6

a concern
could be a
to rely on
rendered by the lawyer. This could lead to virtually unlimited liability.
IS

In the case of an opinion letter, such as we have here, those concerns do not
prevail. The lawyer issuing the letter is specifically aware of the reliance by the
non-client. The universe of potential injured parties is limited to those to whom
the letter is addressed. The rule proposed by the detendants is tantamount to a
grant of immunity to the attorney.
(R 2568-69 (emphasis added). 4
As to the first element of the balance-of-the-harms test, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle
prepared and delivered the opinion letter to Taylor for him to rely upon. (R 824-28; App. A.) The
opinion letter's purpose was to benefit and influence Taylor. ld. No one forced Riley and
Turnbow to prepare and deliver the opinion letter. (R 72
2155

~1

~1 0,

96-97

~l 0,

824-28, 1784-85

~1 0,

0.) The opinion letter made significant representations to Taylor, including the

following:

[1] We have relied upon ... the corporate records provided to us by the
Company ... [2] The Company and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and
authority to enter into, execute and deliver the Transaction Documents and to
perform their respective obligations thereunder; [3] all corporate action on the
pati of Company and its Subsidiaries, and their respective directors and
shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and
the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and
[41 the Transaction Documents have been duly executed and delivered by
Company and its Subsidiaries ... [5] The Transaction Documents constitute the
valid and binding obligation of Company and its Subsidiaries enforceable against
4ln fact, Riley agreed with Judge Greenwood's reasoning when he was deposed in 2012. (R 2855, p. 68.)

7

violate
regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree ... [81 No consent, authorization,
approval or exemption by, or filing with, any Person or any Governmental
Authority is required in connection with the execution, delivery and performance
by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to
Closing ... 191 Upon delivery of ceI1ificates representing the Pledged Shares of
AlAI and Farmers to Shareholder at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a
perfected first priority security interest in such Pledged Shares ... IIOJ but the
inclusion of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or
enforceability of other provisions of the Transaction Documents and, Ill) in the
event Company or any of its Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms
of the Transaction Documents, Mr. Taylor may exercise remedies that would
normally be available under Idaho law to a secured party provided Idaho law
applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with such law ...
(R 824-27; App. A, p. 1-4 (emphasis added).) The Eberle law firm recognized potential liability
and formed a committee to approve opinion letters prior to delivery. (R 2862, p. 96-97.) Judge
Greenwood coneetiy ruled that "[t)he universe of potential injured parties is limited to those to
whom the letter is addressed." (R. 2569.) In fact, if the opinion letter had been coneet or
disclosed the reasoning for the opinions, it would have allowed Taylor to ensure that AlA
complied with I.e. § 30-1-6. (R 3385-86

~f;

App. B, p. 8-9.) Appellants were aware that if the

transaction was illegal and the opinion letter was inconeet, Taylor would be damaged. (R 351-

76,820.) Taylor v. AlA Services Co;p., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011).
As to the second element, if opinion letters are inconect, there is a high likelihood of
harm. As Judge Greenwood noted, "[t]he lawyers issuing the opinion letter is [sic] specifically
aware of the reliance by the non-client." (R 2569.) When Judge Brudie ruled the stock

8

n.1
s

Taylor, 151 Idaho

111

was left with an unent()rceable $6M Note and

110

retirement funds. (R 820-22

~~13,

Taylor
16.) There

was a high degree of certainty of foreseeable harm to Taylor, particularly when Riley, Turnbow
and Eberle were general counsel for AlA. (R 824, 3384 ~~c-d; App. A, p. I; App. B, p. 7 '[~c-d.)
As to the third element, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's conduct could not be closer to
Taylor's injury. The opinion letter was vital to Taylor as a condition for closing the redemption
transaction. (R 838, 72

~l 0,

96-97

~l 0,

824-28, 1784-85

~l 0.)

redemption transaction absent the opinion letter. (R 815-16

Taylor would not have closed the
~~5-6,

1398-1400.) As Professor

McDennott opined, had the opinion letter revealed Riley's convoluted "fair value" analysis,
which he claims to have performed at the time the letter was prepared, it would have raised red
t1ags, and any reasonable opinion recipient would have taken action to ensure compliance with

I.e. § 30-1-6. (R 2936-44, 3386 ~f; App. B, p. 9 ~f.)
As to the fourth element of the balance-of-the-harms test, there is no question of the
moral blame attributable to Appellants. They were general counsel for AlA and prepared the
opinion letter. (R 824; App. A, p. 1.) They controlled the accuracy of their opinions. Id. Unlike
Harrigfeld where the beneficiary might not even know about the will or its effect, Appellants

addressed the opinion letter to Taylor and invited him to rely on it. (R 824,828; App. A, p. 1,5.)
As to the fifth element, there is great need for a policy preventing future hann by
imposing a duty on those issuing opinion letters to accurately prepare such letters. By imposing

9

create

to provide
to prevent opinion

li'om being

(R

'11'; App.

B, p. 9 ~If.)

As to the sixth element. no heavy burden is being imposed on opinion givers. Opinion
givers determine the transactions that they prepare and deliver opinion letters for. Opinion givers
decide whether they arc willing to risk their reputation and potential liability by providing an
opinion letter addressed to a non-client. As Judge Greenwood found, "[t]he universe of potential
injured parties is limited to those to whom the letter is addressed." (R 2569.)
As to the seventh element of the test, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle collectively have
$20,000,000 in coverage to pay for defense costs and any damages. (R 2854, p. 64, 3011, p. 12,
3024-66.) The policies evidence the availability of insurance for opinion givers and Judge
Greenwood recognized that such insurance was available. (ld; Tr. I, p. 44, L. 16-25,46, L. 3-7.)
Judge Greenwood's two decisions imposing duties upon Riley, Turnbow and Eberle to
prepare and deliver the opinion letter to Taylor in a non-negligent fashion are consistent with all
of the elements of the balance-of-the-harms test. (R 1684,2567-69.) If this Court rules that Judge
Greenwood should have analyzed all seven elements of that test, his failure to do so is harmless
error because all of the elements of the test were satisfied. LR.C.P. 52; LR.C.P. 61.
Although this precise issue is one of first impression in Idaho, Judge Greenwood's
decisions are consistent with the long history of cases in other jurisdictions holding that nonclients are owed duties through opinion letters. Bradford Sees. Processing Servs., Inc. v. Plaza

Bank and Trust, 653 P.2d 188, 189-91 (Ok!. 1982); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1563
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(
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, 1991); Pl'1Idential

Co.

W(

. 1990);

(1

at

, v.

v,

F

(9th

Am, v, Dewey, Ballantine, Bushhy, Palmer & Wood, 605 N

2d 318, 320 (N,Y, 1992); MOJ1lgmnelY Cnly. v.

.Jqtfe, Rail!, Heller

& Weiss, PC, 897 F,Supp,

7 (D.C. Md. 1995); Dean F'()ods Co. v. Pappalhanasi, 2004 WL 3019442

233,

Super. Ct. 2004); see also

RESTAT(~MENT

* 11

(Mass.

(Ti 111m) OF LA W GOVERNING LA WYERS ~ 51(2) (2000);

Glazer and Fitzgibbon on Legal Opinions,

~2.3.2

at 67 (3d ed.) ("Glazer") ("The general rule on

liability is that a lawyer owes a duty of care to a non-client addressee of a closing opinion");
Legal Opinion Letters: A Comprehensive Guide to Opinion Practice, §3.3 at 3-9 (3d ed.) ("the
giver of an emmCOllS legal opinion who fails to exercise reasonable care in connection therewith
can be held liable for negligence,,).5
Finally, Taylor's expert, Professor Richard T. McDermott, has been a member of the
preeminent TriBal' Opinion Committee for over 20 years-the Committee that publishes the
reports that Riley relies upon for his opinion practice. (R 2844, p. 24, 3380

~8.)

McDermott

opined as to breach of duty and proximate cause; and Riley, Turnbow and Eberle never rebutted
those opinions. 6 (R 3382-86; App. B, p. 5-9.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have failed to provide
any compelling reasons why the Comi should not find that opinion givers owe duties to the
addressees of opinion letters. Accordingly, this Comi should affirm Judge Greenwood's decision

Taylor's ex pelt witness in this case is the author of this Chapter. (R 3380 ~7; App. B, p. 3 ~7.)
McDermott also opined that the alleged negligent acts of Taylor's independent counsel Cairncross are
separate and distinct from Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's duties owed to him through the opinion letter. (R 3386 n. 2;
App. B, p. 9 n. 2.) Glazer, §§l.l, 1.3.1 and 2.3.2 at 1,10-12 & 67; Legal Opinion Letters, §3.2 at 3-4. As noted by
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle, Taylor has also pursued claims against his independent counsel. (R 1895-1911.)
5

6
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to

that opinion

no authority

should not

owe such duties; they merely nakedly assert that this Court should not recognize duties being
owed to the non-client recipients of opinion letters. (See Riley B1'. at 38-40; Eberle Br. at 13-19.)
2. The Court Should Affirm on All Correct or Alternate Theories.

Judge Greenwood's decision should be aftinned on all the correct alternative theories
through which duties are owed to Taylor, which were by him on summary judgment and
reconsideration. 7 (R 40-48, 1674-75, 1677-95, 2446-49, 2452-58, 2796-98, 2823-27.) Taylor is
not seeking to reverse a final judgment, so a cross appeal is not required. 8 Mussell, 139 Idaho at
33; Mickelsen, 153 Idaho at 154; Idaho Dev., LLC, 152 Idaho at 409. In order for this Court to

answer the question presented to Judge Greenwood, it should determine the causes of action
through which duties are owed-there cannot be one without the other. (R 1814-18, 1888-89.)
This Court should hold that duties are owed to Taylor not to make negligent
misrepresentations. Judge Greenwood dismissed that claim because this Court limited the claim
to accountants. Id. (R 40-41, 824-28, 1674-75, 2446-47; T1'. I, p. 118-20, 130; App. A.) Judge
Greenwood explained, "Well, I have to take [the Idaho Supreme Court] at their word. And they
didn't say: We've limited it to professionals or we're limiting it to CPAs and similar people with

7 Judge Greenwood denied Taylor's motion for reconsideration because the "motion was withdrawn at the
hearing." (R. 2570.) There was some confusion as to the portion of the motion that was withdrawn: (The Court):
You withdraw the motion as to Hawley Troxell? (Mr. Gaffney): Yes. (Tr. II, p. 79, L. 13-15.) Taylor's motion for
reconsideration was withdrawn only as to Hawley Troxell.
8 And, in fact, was dismissed by the Court. (R 2674-75.)
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it to accountants."
as a

upon
V.

174

441 (N

. I, p. 11
it

1) and Credit Alliance

Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First

BanCOll) o(ldaho, 115 fdaho 1082, 1083-84, 772 P.2d 720 (1989). In the well-known Prudential
case, the New York Court of Appeals "stressed that attorneys, like other professionals, may be
held liable for economic injury arising from negligent misrepresentation" and "there is no reason
to arbitrarily limit the potential liability to" accountants. Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 320. The New
York Court went on to rely on the Credit Alliance case relied upon by this Court in Idaho Bank
& Trust Co., when it held that an attorney may be liable for negligent misrepresentation in an

opinion letter to a non-client. Id. at 322; Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 115 Idaho at 1083-84. Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle voluntarily provided the opinion letter to Taylor for him to rely upon for the
redemption of his shares. (R 96 '8, 72 '10, 54 ,,10-11, 824-28, 2960; App. A.) The opinion
letter made numerous misrepresentations of fact and opinion. (R 824-28; App. A.) Like
Prudential, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle were well aware that their opinion letter would be relied
upon by Taylor for the stock redemption transaction and "the end and aim of the opinion letter
was to provide [Taylor] with the .. .information [he] required." Prudential, 605 N.E.2d at 322. (R
824-28; App. A.) "[A]s fully expected by [Riley, Turnbow and Eberle, Taylor] unquestionably
relied on the opinion letter in agreeing" to sell his shares and Judge Brudie has made that
determination as matter of law. Id. (R. 362 n. 15, 8l3-20.) "Finally, by addressing and sending
the opinion letter directly to [Taylor, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle] clearly engaged in conduct
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awareness

on

N.

at

[Taylor] was sufficiently

to

establish a duty of care running from the former to the latter." ld.; see also Roberts v. Ball, Hunt,

Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901,906 (CaL Ct. App. 1976); Greycas, 826 F.2d 1560;
RESTATEMENT (TI(JRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS §§ 95(1) and (3). There is no reason for
limiting negligent misrepresentation claims to accountants. This Court should hold that a duties
are also owed through an opinion letter based on the theory of negligent misrepresentations and
expand DI!tfin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d 1195 (1995).
This Court should also affirm Judge Greenwood including the correct theory(ies) of a
duty being owed to Taylor through an assumed duty negligence/malpractice claim. Taylor
argued an assumed duty claim below and Judge Greenwood either implicitly accepted that
argument in his decisions or it should be formally adopted now. LR.C.P. 52. (R 41-43, 1532-33,
1685,2447,2567-70; Tr. I, p. 111-12.) This Court has already ruled that an attorney may assume
"a voluntary duty to act in [non-clienfs] best interests." Jones, 125 Idaho at 612-13. Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle voluntarily prepared and delivered the opinion letter to Taylor and he relied
upon it. (R 96

~8,

72

~10,

54

~~1O-11,

813-20, 824-28, 2960; App. A.) McDermott opined that

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle had assumed and breached duties of care. (R 3385-86

~f;

App. B, p.

8-9 ~f.) This Court should hold that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle assumed duties to Taylor.

B. The Duties Owed to Taylor Should Not Be Limited.
Riley asserts for the first time on appeal that the duties owed to Taylor should be limited

14

must

more

at

on
1866-90,
2674-75.) Forte, I

J,

Idaho at 866; Rountree, 296 P.3d at 376. Riley's arguments also lack merit.

1. The Opinion Letter Has No Terms Limiting the Duties Owed to Taylor.

Riley argues that the duties owed to Taylor should be limited to "drafl[ing] and issu[ing] a
non-negligent opinion letter." Riley submits no authority for this argument, thereby waiving the
issue on appeal. F'orte, 153 Idaho at 866. Judge Greenwood ruled that "Riley and Turnbow had a
duty to Taylor, a no[n]-c1ient, to draft the opinion letter in a no[nJ-negligent fashion" and "[t]he
lawyer issuing the letter is specifically aware of the reliance by the non-client." (R 1684, 2569;
App. A.) The opinion lctter contains no limitations on the duties owed to Taylor and states that
he may rely upon it for the "Transaction Documents and transactions contemplated thereby." (R
828, 824-28; App. A.) Because Riley, Turnbow and Eberle acted as general counsel for AIA,9
drafted and approved the stock redemption agreement and related instruments, and provided
Taylor with the opinion letter, then under the balance-of-the-harms test they assumed and/or
owed duties to Taylor to ensure that he would get what was promised to him in the Transaction
Documents, as further warranted by the opinion letter. (R 53-54
824-28, 1784-85 ~1O, 2153

~3,

~~8

& 10, 72 ~1 0, 96-97 ~1O,

2172-2223, 2960.) Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho 134. Under this Court's

reasoning in Harrigfeld, the attorneys (Riley, Turnbow and Eberle) for the testator (AlA)
9 "It is an ancient maxim that general counsel cannot thus delegate his duties of skill and discretion by the
corporation delegated to him." Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. North Butte Min. Co., 4 F.Supp. 711, 713 (D.
Montana 1933). The opinion letter states: "[w]e have acted as general counsel for [AlA] in connection with the
transactions contemplated by the [Stock Redemption] Agreement." (R 824; App. A, p. 1.)
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that he
10

assets

(the

of money and

security interests in the stock redemption agreement and related instruments). Id (R 824-28,
21

. App. A.) The intent expressed in the stock redemption agreement and related

instruments (including the $6M Note) were "'frustrated in whole" by Judge Brudie's rulings.
llarriKleld, 140 Idaho at 139. (R 351-76.) The bottom line is that they communicated legal

advice to Taylor and promised that he would receive the benefit of the bargain. CR. 824-28; App.
A.) Taylor did not receive what was promised. Id.

the HarriKfeld beneficiary had malpractice

claims without an opinion letter, there is even more reason for Taylor to have those claims.1O

2. There Is No Basis to Require Taylor to Prove More than Ordinary Negligence.
Riley argues that this Court should adopt "justifiable or reasonable reliance" as an
expansion to the existing elements of a malpractice claim. As this Court held in HarriKfeld, the
non-client's claim is based on "the attorney's professional negligence." Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at
139. This Court did not create a special 'justifiable reliance" element for that claim. !d. at 13839. Contrary to Riley's assertion, Judge Greenwood "refer [ed], somewhat loosely, to the
negligence claim that survives as the 'malpractice claim. '" (R 2560 n. 3.) This Court's decision
in Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616, 620,272 P.3d 1247 (2012) does not stand for the proposition
that "reliance" should be a new element for a malpractice claim. Riley cites no authority for
"reliance" to be an element and his argument fails. Forte, 153 Idaho at 866.
10 If Riley, Turnbow and Eberle had only provided the opinion letter and not represented AlA in drafting
the agreements, then their duties to Taylor would arguably have been limited only to the accuracy of their opinions.
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are

Report

adopt it. (R

824-28~

.)

the

to
Party I

at

167, 179-80,219 (1991). The opinion letter

App. A, p. 1 .) Indeed,

"Ii In

not

accepting an opinion letter, an opinion

recipient ordinarily need not take any action to veri(y the opinions it contains." ABA Legal
Opinion Principals ~I(E), 53 Bus. Law 831,832 (1998).11 Taylor testified that he relied on the
opinion letter and the opinions contained therein. (R 813-17.) In his

brief~

Riley omits a material

portion of TriBal' II: "The recipient of a third-party opinion letter is entitled (except in a few
jurisdictions)12 to rely on the opinions expressed without taking any action to verify those
opinions." TriBal' Opinion Committee, Third-Party "Closing" Opinions §1.6, 56 Bus. Law. 591,
604 (1998) ("TriBar II"). Riley admitted that he relied upon the TriBar Reports for his opinion
practice and McDermott, Taylor's expert witness, is a long-time member of the Committee that
drafted TriBar II. (R 2844, P 24, L. 8-11, 3380, .,-r8; App. B, p. 3, .,-r8.) The opinion letter was a
"clean opinion." (R. 824-28, 3385 .,-rf; App. A-B, p. 3 .,-rf.) TriBar II § 1.2, 53 Bus. Law. at 597 n.
15. McDermott testified the opinion letter did not provide the required disclosures or "reasoned
opinions" for Riley's so-called "fair value" or other analysis and, thus, was misleading. (R. 293544,2984-85,3386 .,-rf; App. B, p. 9 .,-rf.) TriBal' II §§1.2, 1.9(h)-(m), 53 Bus. Law. at 597,606-07.
Taylor's reliance was adjudicated when Judge Brudie ruled that he "relie[d] heavily on an
August 15, 1995 opinion letter." (R 362 n. 15, 1391 .,-r4.) Moreover, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle

II This report acknowledged "the Accord has not gained the national acceptance the Committee had
hoped." Idat 831. See ABA Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, 47 Bus. Law. 167 (1991).
12 Until now, Idaho is one of the "few jurisdictions" that has not addressed the issue.
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Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated thereby; and it may not be ... relied
upon, by any other person." (R 828; App. A, p.

The Court should decline making "justifiable

or reasonable reliance" a new element of a legal opinion malpractice claim.

Judge Greenwood ruled that Taylor's claims are not barred by res judicata. (R. 2559-63.)
This Court may also affirm his refusal to apply res judicata based on anyone or more of the
other reasons asserted by Taylor below. j\4ussell, 139 Idaho at 33; Mickelsen, 153 Idaho at 15;
Idaho Dev., 152 Idaho at 409; LR.C.P. 61. (R 2470 n. 1,2471, 2472-86, 2451, 2467-68, 1463-

1508, 1650-52.) "Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it must prove all
of the essential elements:" (1) the same claims; (2) a final judgment; and (3) the same parties.
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122-24, 157 P.3d 613 (2007).
1. Judge Greenwood Correctly Ruled that Taylor's Claims Here Is a Different

Transaction.
The thrust of Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's arguments to apply res judicata is that the
transaction in this case was the same as the one in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d
642 (2010).13 Judge Greenwood ruled "the [A1cNichols]14 case and current case are not
sufflciently related in time, space, origin, motivation or trial evidence to arise from the same

13 Riley and Eberle and Turnbow refer to Taylor v. McNichols as "Riley Lawsuit #1" and "Hawley Troxell
No. I," respectively. (Riley Br. at 12-29; Eberle Br. at 19-22.)
J4 Judge Greenwood refers to the McNichols case as "Babbitt" in his decision. (R 2561.)
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a
a
to be determined
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage:'
Stanion, 144 Idaho at 126 (citation omitted). "The 'sameness' of a cause of action for purposes

of application of the doctrine of res judicata is determined by examining the operative facts
underlying the two lawsuits." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149,804 P.2d
319 (1990). Judge Greenwood correctly stated the factual grouping constituting the transaction
for Taylor's claims here and the factual grouping for the transaction in his claims in McNichols:
The factual grouping that constitutes a transaction in [McNichols], is the thwarted
efforts of Reed Taylor to gain control of AlA and collect the money due on the
note. Reed Taylor was suing Riley and the other attorneys for their behavior in
representing John Taylor and AlA in that action. His references to the opinion
letter were in the context of his unsuccessful effort to convince Judge Brudie that
he had a tort cause of action for the lawyer conduct in [McNichols]. He was
claiming that Riley's new finn, Hawley Troxell, and its lawyers owed a duty to
not represent AlA or John Taylor because Riley earlier represented Reed Taylor
in authoring the opinion letter. While the opinion letter played a role in the AlA
suit and in Babbitt, the issuance of the opinion letter arose from an entirely
separate set offacts and circumstances.

In this case, the factual grouping that constitutes the transaction is the issuance of
the opinion letter and events surrounding its issuance. This is 10 years remote in
time from the events that led to the [McNichols] case. The claim originates in
Turnbow's and Riley's alleged malpractice in drafting the 1995 opinion letter.
This is wholly unrelated to the alleged conduct in [McNichols}. .. The opinion
letter was not central, or even important in the outcome in [McNichols]. What Mr.
Riley did, or did not do, while drafting the 1995 opinion letter has nothing to do
with him helping John Taylor and AlA commit torts in 2007. Although, this
current case and [McNichols] have a common tie in the 1995 stock redemption
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cases
current case arc not
or
to
the two cases do not
out of
same transaction or
related transactions, Taylor's claim against Riley is not barred by resjudicala ... 15
(R 2561-63.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle focus on trying to convince this Court that Taylor could
have asserted his claims here in McNichols, instead of proving the operative facts were the same
and that the

l~lctuaI

grouping, evidence, trial evidence and motivations were the same.

An examination of the facts asserted in Taylor's complaints against HTEH (and Riley)
and Clements Brown is dispositive. Both complaints assert claims for conversion, tortious
interference, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, fraud and malpractice representing the AlA
corporations. (R 620-668.) The two cases were virtually identical, which is why this Court
consolidated them on appeal. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 830. A review of the complaints,
pleadings, memoranda, transcripts and decisions in both cases show they were based on the same
transaction, which is an entirely different one than in this case. (R 383-553, 753-773, 972-75,
1284-1388.) At the hearing held to dismiss both cases in A1cNichols, Riley's attorney argued
"[t]his case presents the question of whether a plaintiff may sue his adversary's attorneys for
decisions made by those attorneys in the course of defending their clients." (R 1364, p. 8,11. 1620 (emphasis added).) Riley asserted: "Taylor's arguments ... depend upon the assumption,
although the complaint does not so allege, that he has already prevailed in the lawsuit against
AlA Services ... (and] anyone who opposes his litigation position in the Underlying Litigation is
15 In his first decision, Judge Greenwood dismissed Taylor's malpractice claims against Hawley Troxell
based on res judicata, "(tJo the extent [he] seeks to make [such) a claim." (R 1682-83.) But Taylor never asserted
any malpractice claim against Hawley Troxell. (R 41-43.)
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right to independent legal representation." (R I

Taylor's duty related claims were limited to Riley and HTEH taking positions against his
opinion letter. (R 704-13.) The proposed amended complaint which was pending at the time of
hearing contained many of the same allegations as the original complaint, did not aUege that the
redemption transaction was illegal, and did not allege that the opinion letter was incorrect. (R
672-716.) Such allegations could not have been made at that time. None of those positions or
operative facts relate to Taylor's claims in the instant case. (R 25-50.) In fact, HTEH and Riley
conceded that Taylor's positions were all based on litigation conduct and related torts. (R 134650.) Judge Brudie best summed up the transaction that comprised Taylor's claims in McNichols:
Plaintiff's core contention is that Defendants are acting in violation of Idaho's
Rules of Professional Conduct by representing all of the corporate defendants in
the underlying case and by entering into a joint defense agreement with the other
named defendants.
(R 721,738,2561-63.) Judge Brudie further held "the conduct and actions of [HTEH and Riley]
that form the basis of [Taylor's] claims are all conduct and actions within the scope of the
underlying litigation." (R 726 (emphasis added).) Judge Brudie never addressed any of the
specific allegations in Taylor's proposed amended complaint, but simply held that he asserted the
same claims and new derivative claims and that they all failed for the same reasons. (R 731.)
Judge Brudie's decisions in both cases were almost entirely based on the "litigation
privilege," as this Court noted. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 848. This Court held that Taylor "has
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not

to

would

to assert that

hired
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to fight off

ITaylor's] litigation against those entities, were being retained for rTaylor'sj benefit." fd. at 845.
When Judge Brudie awarded fees to HTEH and Riley, he held that the "gravamen of [Taylor's]
attempted recovery is the alleged acts and/or conduct of the Defendants in representing their
corporate clients." (R 757.) When HTEH and Riley moved for reconsideration of Judge Bmdie's
decision to award fees, Riley's attorney admitted that Taylor's complaint against Clements
Brown "involved allegations and issues similar to those asserted" against his clients. (R 1385.)
Clements Brown and Mr. McNichols had nothing to do with the stock redemption
transaction in 1995 or the 1995 opinion letter. (R 409-31.) The fact that Clements Brown and
Mike McNichols were also defendants and Turnbow and Eberle were not defendants simply
confirms that the transaction in McNichols was entirely different. (R 383-431.) Similarly,
Babbitt, Ashby, and Collins were not named as defendants in this lawsuit for the same reason. (R
25-50.) These facts alone are fatal to Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's res judicata argument. Judge
Greenwood correctly summarized the differences between the transaction here and the
transaction in McNichols. (R 561-63.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have failed to show that Judge
Greenwood erred by ruling and confirming that the transactions were different.
Riley attempts to mislead the Court by selectively quoting the McNichols' complaint
while omitting material portions of the McNichols' allegations, which were on litigation conduct:
The Defendants owed AlA ... AlA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed 1. Taylor a duty of
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as "duty of
breached
duty
care as a result of
actions and/or omission
damaging the corporations and Reed .I. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.
(R 644 '162.) As seen by the above quote, Riley's quote was misleading. Riley asserts that
"Taylor undertook herculean efforts to prevent dismissal of his complaint by moving to amend
his complaint." (Riley 13r. at 25.) Rilcy's citation to the record is to the first page of Taylor's
motion to amcnd and nothing more. (R 699.) Riley also provides many incomplete quotes to the
allegations asserted in paragraphs 16, 68, 92, 99, 103, 107 and 188 of Taylor's proposed
amended complaint. (Riley Br. at 25-26.) For example, Riley quotes a portion of paragraph 99 of
the McMchols' complaint, but omits that section of the allegations which demonstrate that the
malpractice claim was based on litigation conduct in the AlA case. (R 707-08

~99.)

The same

omissions and misleading quotes appear in the other paragraphs partially quoted by Riley. (R
676-77

~16,

697

~68,

704-05

~92,

709-10

~107,

713

~118.)

In paragraph 16 of Taylor's proposed

amended complaint, he refened to a different inconect opinion letter given to another lender. (R
867-75, 859-61 § 4.2.9(c).) Riley's quote to paragraph 103 of the amended complaint must be
read in conjunction with the other paragraphs of that malpractice claim, as it pertained to
litigation conduct, not an incorrect letter or a transaction ruled to be illegal. (R 707-08

~~96-104.)

2. Taylor's Claims Here Are Based on Different Operative Facts.
A claim based on facts occuning after a first lawsuit is not one that "might or should

have been litigated under the first suit."

us.

Bank Nat '[ Ass 'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226,

999 P.2d 877 (2000); Durant v. Quality First Mktg., Inc., 127 Idaho 558,560,903 P.2d 147, 149
23
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allowing a
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not precluded by the

Court held that

and
Restatement

approach allows a second suit to proceed when justified by post judgment developments." Id.
Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to
the same subject matter may in themselves, or in conjunction with the antecedent
facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not
precluded by the first.
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho at 226 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. f (1982));
see also Green v. Gough, 96 Idaho 927, 930, 539 P.2d 280 (1975); Mellor v. Chamberlain, 673

P.2d 610, 613 (W A. 1983). On April 16, 2008, the defense of illegality was raised, for the first
time, when it was alleged that AlA had made an illegal shareholder distribution to Taylor in
violation of LC. § 30-1-46. (R 334-44, 2829-35.) On June 13, 2008, AlA made a substantial
settlement offer to Taylor, which called into question the merit of the alleged illegality argument.
(R 2834-35, 3334-35.) On July 17, 2008, Taylor filed a preliminary response and asserted that
I.C. § 30-1-46 was the incorrect statute. (R 1967, 2834.) Taylor's claims in McNichols were
dismissed on December 23, 2008. (R 480-515.) On February 12, 2009, Connie Taylor asserted
for the first time that the stock redemption agreement violated the "earned surplus" restrictions of
I.C. § 30-1-6, nearly two months after Taylor's complaints were dismissed in McNichols. (480515, 2070-2115, 2829-35.) The operative facts supporting Taylor's claims here occurred when
Judge Brudie ruled that that stock redemption agreement was both illegal and unenforceable on
June 17, 2009, six months after the McNichols complaints were dismissed. (R 351-65, 480-515.)
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case.
1995

1996 Stock Redemption Agreement are central to
Plaintiff's causcs of action for professional negligence." (R 1710.) Riley also agreed:

Itlhe question of whether or not the redemption agreement was illegal is currently
be/l)re the Idaho Suprcme Court. In the event the Idaho Supreme Court reversed
Judge Brudie's decision, then the entire premise of the current case will cease to
exist and this case will become moot.
(R 1704.) If the entire basis for Taylor's claims in this case would cease to exist if this Court
reversed Judge Brudie, then it was impossible for Taylor to assert his claims in this case until
Judge Brudie made the initial ruling that the stock redemption agreement was both illegal and
unentl)fceable. Ironically, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle maintain in this lawsuit that "[t]he 1995
Opinion Letter was and is believed by this answering defendant to be correct," based on a
number of theories that Taylor unsuccessfully argued. (R 2936,2984,2936-44,2984-86,2862, p.
97, 2867, p. 115-16, 2868, p. 120, 2886, p. 192-94.) Taylor, 151 Idaho at 559-65. It was
impossible for Taylor to assert claims that the transaction was illegal or the opinion letter was
ineolTect until Judge Brudie made that detennination on June 17, 2009. !d. (R 351-65.) Those
operative facts comprise an entirely new transaction to support Taylor's claims here. (R 24-50.)

3. Res Judicata Does Not Apply Because there was No Adjudication on the Merits.
Res judicata cannot apply here because Taylor's complaints were not adjudicated on the
merits. (R 480-515.) McNichols, 149 Idaho at 836-49. Riley, Turbow and Eberle have failed to
provide argument and authority for the justiciability issues. This Court should not entertain their
arguments. Forte, 153 Idaho at 866. (R 1825-26,1867-79,2516-29,2570,3408-30.)
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adjudication on the merits). "Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories-advisory
opinions ... standing, ripeness, [andj mootness." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639,
778 P.2d

(1989). Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have pleaded no justiciable controversy as

defenses, which include standing, ripeness and litigation privilege. (R 66, 86, Ill, 1798.) Res
judicata cannot bar Taylor's claims because there was no justiciable controversy in AkNichols.

In McNichols, Taylor's complaints against HTEH (including Riley) and Clements Brown
were dismissed on the basis of the litigation privilege and his motions to amend were denied on
that same basis. (R 24-50, 486-94, 504-510, 513-14.) An attorney has "qualified immunity"
under the litigation privilege until the underlying the litigation has concluded. McNichols, 149
Idaho at 836-43; McKinsey v. Vernon, 130 Idaho 354, 357, 941 P.2d 326 (1997). Riley, Turnbow
and Eberle have asserted "litigation privilege" as affirmative defenses. (R 64, 84, 109, 1796.)
HTEH and Riley asserted Taylor's "complaint is deficient because the actions of HTEH in
connection with the Underlying Litigation are protected by the litigation privilege." (R 1315-16,
1322, 1345, 1356, 1365, 1367.) Consistent with the qualified immunity granted under the
litigation privilege, Judge Brudie dismissed Taylor's claims based on litigation privilege. (R
486.) Judge Brudie explained: "[i]n the instant matter, the conduct and actions of the Defendants,
as alleged by Plaintiff, all fall within the scope of the Defendants' representation of their clients
and, therefore, fall within the protection of the litigation privilege." (R 492.) The Court held on
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Only when a case
concluded may one truly identify ... whether an
attorney has committed malpractice ... Therefore, we conclude that 1.1 cause of
action against one party's opponent's attorney in litigation, based on conduct the
attorney committed in the course of that litigation, may not be properly instituted
prior to the resolution of that litigation ... Until the Underlying case is resolved a
court cannot determine whether any tortious act was committed ...
Id. at 843. Thus, Taylor's claims in McNichols were not decided on the merits. Id. It is
undisputed that Riley acted as opposing counsel in the ALA litigation and that he, Turnbow and
Eberle sought and obtained a protective order in this case based on the Shelton/Wood criteria. (R
2688-2738,

.) Evcn if Taylor had pled all of his present claims in McNichols, those

claims were not ripe for adjudication until Taylor had concluded. (R 2303-07.)
Taylor's claims in this case were not ripe as in McNichols and, therefore, cannot be barred
by res judicata. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 849; Kuenzli, 134 Idaho at 226; Duthie v. Lewiston Gun
Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983); Bannon, 128 Idaho at 44. Turnbow and Eberle
asserted the defense that Taylor's "cause of action is not ripe for controversy given that there is
pending [Taylor, 151 Idaho 552] before the Idaho Supreme Court." (R 66, 86, 111, 1798.) To
plead and prove a malpractice claim, Taylor must prove breach of the duty and the failure to
perform the duty was a proximate cause of the damages. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 585, 590,21
P.3d 908 (2000). Prior to Judge Brudie's ruling, Taylor could not have pleaded "hypothetical"
facts that the stock redemption agreement was both illegal and unenforceable as claims in the
McNichols litigation. Miles, 116 Idaho at 642. (R 351-65.)
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Court reversed in Taylor, 151 Idaho

that Taylor's
(R 1703-1

would he mooted

the

2739-49; 'II'. t p. 143-45,151-57.) Eberle

and Turnbow argued that legality and enforceability of the stock redemption agreement was
'"central" to Taylor's claims for professional negligence. (R 1710.) Riley agreed. (R t 704.)

If Riley, Turnbow and Eberle believed that Taylor's claims were not ripe after Judge
Brudie's ruling because Taylor appealed that decision, then there is no way that his claims could
have been ripe before Judge Brudie made his ruling. (R 351-65, 362 n. 15,366-76.) Moreover,
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle maintain that the 1995 Opinion Letter is correct. (R 2831-35, 2936,
2984,2936-44,2984-86,2862, p. 97,2867, p. 115-16,2868, p. 120,2886, p. 192-94.) Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle's positions are consistent with this Court's decision that: "[wJe find that in
all instances the claims brought by [Taylor] ... are not ripe for litigation." McNichols, 149 Idaho
at 665. This Court explained that: "[t]he clear reasoning behind [City of McCall v. Buxton, 146
Idaho 661, 201 P.3d 629 (2008)] was that the cause of action cannot arise until damages are
incurred, and the attorney's conduct can be viewed under the totality of the case." Jd. at 659.
Taylor agrees and asserts that his claims did not and could not accrue until the date of Judge
Brudie's decision: June 17,2009. Jd.; Jordan, 135 Idaho at 590; Mack Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 111
Idaho 8,11-12,720 P.2d 191 (1986).16 (R 351-65.) Thus, it was factually and legally impossible

16 In Mack Financial, this Court explained that there must be an adverse ruling for the statute of limitations
to run and this rationale supports Taylor's position, but does not support Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's positions.
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claims, but only moves the accrual

date for the claims from April 2008 to June 1

2009. (R 1688.) Once Riley availed himself of

the litigation privilege, the statute or limitations was tolled until the underlying case was
concluded. llaving obtained an advantage through staying this case based on the position that
Taylor's claims were not ripe or would be moot and by now taking the inconsistent position that
Taylor's claims were ripe or not moot, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle should be judicially estopped
from asserting resjudicafa. A1cKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 1222 (1997).
Taylor's claims were dismissed for lack of standing, so his claims cannot be barred by res

judicata. Bannon, 128 Idaho at 44; Gilbert v. Nampa 5'ch Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137, 140-41,
657 P.2d 1 (1983). In McNichols, HTEH's and Riley's motions to dismiss argued that Taylor
lacked standing. (R 1310-12, 1315, 1345, 1347, 1365.) Judge Brudie dismissed Taylor's
malpractice claims due to lack of standing and held that Taylor's amended complaint failed for
the same reasons as his original one. (R 493,511, 731.) This Court held on appeal that Taylor
lacked standing to assert malpractice claims. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 845.
Here, Taylor does not assert malpractice claims based on his status as a secured creditor or
a stock pledgee. (R 24-50.) His claims are based on his status as a party injured by an
inducement to sell his shares based on an incorrect opinion letter. This injury conferred standing
on Taylor to assert his claims on June 17, 2009 and thus his claims are not barred by res

judicata. (R 1685, 2567-70.)
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at 124, There is no privity when "[tjhe judgment in the first action was based on a defense that
was personal to the defendant in the first action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
51(1)(b) (1982). Judge Greenwood ruled "that res judicata cannot apply to the Defendants
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin because they were not parties to the earlier litigation." (R 3434,
2561.) Riley's privity was with HTEH, not Eberle and Turnbow. Riley's defenses of the
litigation privilege and lack of standing in McNichols were personal only to him as AlA's
attorney at that time.
Turnbow and Eberle were in conflict with Riley and HTEH's arguments that the stock
redemption agreement was illegal. AMJUR JUDGMENTS § 589. (R 2763-64, 2984.) Indeed, Riley
held conflicting positions in his capacity as counsel for AlA that the stock redemption agreement
was illegal, while personally and on behalf of Eberle maintaining the transaction was legal and
the opinion letter was correct. (R 116,4,345-50,565-66, '10, 1719-22,2712,2936-44,298486.) It would be fundamentally unfair to have Riley, Turnbow or Eberle in privity with any of the
defendants in McNichols. There is no privity for res judicata to apply in the instant case. 17

D. Taylor Did Not Waive His Claims through the Illegal 1996 Restructure Agreement.
Judge Greenwood agreed with McDermott that Taylor's "shares had already been
redeemed" in 1995 and "the 1996 agreement is void as a document in furtherance of the illegal

17

St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 974 P.2d 611,618-19 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
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redemption restructure agreement. (Riley Br. at 30-34; Eberle Br. a122-28.)
Turnbow and Eberle waived this issue on appeal because they did not provide b()ll:t
argument and authority in their brief. Forte, 153 Idaho at 866. They failed to provide any
argument and authority that Taylor "relinquished a right or advantage" or that they acted in
reliance or "altered their positions" in any way. See Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho
449, 457, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011). Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have waived the issue because
they do not provide any authority to overrule this Court's decision that the 1995 and 1996
redemption agreements were illegal and unenforceable. Id.; Taylor, 151 Idaho 552.
The Court has already ruled that both the 1995 stock redemption agreement and the 1996
stock redemption restructure agreement were illegal and unenforceable. Taylor, 151 Idaho 552.

In Taylor, the Court included the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement in the
definition of "Stock Redemption Agreement" when it ruled that both agreements were illegal and
unenforceable.ld. at 558, 559-67. The Court also affirmed the judgment entered by Judge Brudie
dismissing all of Taylor's breach of contract claims, which included the contract claims on the
$6M Note. !d. at 573-74. (R 854-56, 2409-19.) On remand, Judge Brudie dismissed Taylor's
remaining claims. (R 2834-36

~20.)

The Court's decision followed Idaho law that "[a] new

promise based on an illegal, invalid consideration cannot validate the original transaction or any
part of it... [and] [t]he courts cannot lend their aid to enforcement of a claimed indebtedness
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Turnbow and Eberle argue that Judge Greenwood "intel1Jrcted Judge 8rudie's ruling too
broadly" by "finding that the promissory note was illegal." (Eberle's 8r. at 26.) The $6M Note
was an exhibit to, and incorporated by reference into, the 1995 stock redemption agreement. (R
2174 §2,1.2, 2188 §§9.l 0-9.11.) Judge Brudie entered judgment dismissing Taylor's contract
claims, including the $6M Note, based on the illegality of the 1995 stock redemption agreement.
(R 854-57, 2409-19.) Any argument that the $6M Note is still enforceable lacks merit.
This Court rejected Taylor's attempt to enforce the 1995 stock redemption agreement
through the release provision in the 1996 stock redemption restructure agreement. Taylor, 151
Idaho at 570. For that reason, even if the 1996 stock redemption restructure agreement contained
a release or waiver of claim, it too would be illegal and unenforceable. Judge Greenwood
correctly ruled that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle "were not parties to that agreement," so there
could be no waiver of claims, in any event. (R 2563,2311 §3.)
Even if the 1996 stock redemption restructure agreement was enforceable, Judge
Greenwood correctly ruled that "there is nothing withdrawing the opinion letter as it relates to
the [$6M Note]." (R 2563-64.) The 1996 stock redemption restructure agreement excludes the
original $6M Note and does not mention the opinion letter. (R 2306 §C.) The opinion letter was
not one of the "Original Documents" and the $6M Note was expressly excluded as one of the
"Superseded Documents." (Id.) The opinion letter remained valid and the $6M Note unchanged.
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obligations" also remained unchanged, speeifically "all commissions from the sale of insurance
or related services ... and any interest thereon" and "AlA Services agrees to grant to [Taylor] ... a
security interest in all right and title to ... the Shares" (which included Taylor's irrevocable right
to vote the shares or transfer them upon default). (R 2195 §C, 2196 § 1, 2207 §C, 2208 §§ 1-2,
2306 §§1

1.3,2324 §§1-2, 2337 §§A-C, 2338 §§1-2.) Moreover, the opinion letter warranted

that Taylor had a perfected security interest

all of the shares pledged to him. (R 826.)

Although Turnbow and Eberle failed to cite any authority, Riley mistakenly relies on
Isaak v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 988, 812 P.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1990)-a ease that

Judge Greenwood also found did not apply. (R 2563.) In Lwak, a new party to a modified
contract asserted issues of duress, lack of consideration and fraud. Isaak, 119 Idaho 988-90. The
holding in L<;aak provides no authority for the proposition that an illegal contract is enforceable
or that a modified contract can supersede and replace documents or claims that were not
mentioned in the modified agreement. There are no terms in the 1996 stock redemption
restructure agreement that support Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's arguments, even if the 1996
agreement was legal and enforceable. (R 2306-13.)
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have not cited any authority for the proposition that the 1996
stock redemption restructure agreement did not proximately cause Taylor's damages. Forte, 153
Idaho at 866. This is because they would need to admit a duty exists in order to reach the element
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into the 1995 agreement." (R

on
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would

not have sold his shares without that opinion letter. (R 816.)
Riley also incorrectly argues that the 1996 stock redemption restructure agreement is the
"controlling document." (Riley Br. at 34.) A review of Taylor's complaint against Cairncross
shows that he is not asserting that the 1996 agreement was the "controlling document.,,18 (R
1832-47.) In that lawsuit, Taylor asserted that Cairncross failed to get a new opinion letter
because Riley, Turnbow and Eberle have raised that issue here and because Cairncross attempted
to hide behind the 1995 opinion letter to support the argument that it properly discharged its
duties to Taylor in 1996. [d.; (Tr. II, p. 56, L. 8-10.) McDermott testified that Appellants
possessed different duties to Taylor than those of independent counsel. (R 3386 n. 2; App. B, p. 9
n.2.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle failed to submit expert opinions to rebut McDermott. Judge
Brudie previously ruled that the illegality was determined in 1995 and not in 1996. (R 357 n. 8.)

E. The 2006 Subordination Is Irrelevant Because the Redemption Was Illegal in 1995.
Judge Greenwood agreed with Taylor's expert witness when he ruled that the 2006
subordination agreement between Taylor and his ex-wife, Donna, was "irrelevant" and "the
[1995] agreement was already in violation of Idaho law, despite any later subordination
agreement." (R 2566,2385-87, 3384-84 ~c; App. B, p. 7-8

~c.)

Riley, Turnbow and Eberle posit

that, prior to Taylor and his ex-wife entering into a subordination agreement in 2006, the
18

Taylor has a right to sue all of the responsible parties and to be made whole. Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho

168, 172, 868 P.2d496 (Ct. App. 1994).
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Eberle Br. at 29.) Turnbow and Eberle nlil to cite

to

am: authority

for their --rail-safe"I') argument. Forte, 153 Idaho at 866. Riley cites only inapplicable authority
and therefore cannot support his argument on appeal. Id
Idaho law does not authorize the redemption of shares, "whether direct or indirect,"
through the issuance of indebtedness that is subordinate to the indebtedness of another
shareholder.

I.e.

(R 2174 §2.1

~

30-1-6; I.e.

~

30-1-2. In 1995, Taylor'S shares were redeemed and cancelled.

) AlA issued indebtedness to Taylor under the $1.5M Note and the $6M note.

(Id) AlA transferred aircraft to Taylor and also gave him addition consideration for the

transaction. (Id.) This Court already rejected the argument of paying over time as being proper:
We hold that I.e. § 30-1-6 allows redeeming stock on credit, but the earned and
capital surplus restrictions still apply ... Nothing in I.e. § 30-1-6 suggests that the
timing of payment has any bearing on the statute's applicability, and given the
statute's purpose, it would be an absurd result to allow a corporation to get around
these restrictions by simply paying on a later date.

Taylor, 151 Idaho at 563. Relying on the Court's ruling in Taylor, Judge Greenwood ruled that
the 2006 agreement had nothing to do with the issuance of the 1995 opinion letter. (R 2566.)
Professor McDermott also testified that "any subordination issues are irrelevant because the
original transaction was illegal." (R 384-84

~c.)

Even if Idaho Code Section 30-1-6 authorized AlA "to get around these restrictions" by
subordinating the principal on the $6M Note, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's arguments fail

19

Riley referred to the argument as the purported "fail-safe" clause. Thus, so did Judge Greenwood.
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at

already ruled that the entire transaction was illegal and unenforceable. Taylor, 151 Idaho 559-67.
Taylor and his ex-wife could not "contractually" subordinate their respective indebtedness
because AlA's indebtedness to Taylor was illegal and unenforceable. ld. Contrary to Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle's allegations, the entire indebtedness to Taylor was not contingent and was
referenced as debt on AlA's financial statements. (R 3336-3377.) Thus, the 2006 subordination
agreement between Taylor

ex-wife is irrelevant because "[t]he cOUl1s cannot lend their

aid to enforcement ofa claimed indebtedness based entirely on an illegal consideration." Fowler,
69 Idaho at 226. (R 2385-87.)
Taylor's ex-wife received all of the outstanding Series A Preferred Shares in connection
with their divorce. This required ALA's articles of incorporation to be amended to protect her. (R
2165-66

~53,

3069, 3095-3124, 3067-3135.) ALA's amended articles contain several restrictive

"Covenants" and if certain payments to Taylor's ex-wife were in default or if any of those
"Covenants" were violated, ALA was barred from transacting in certain ways, including the
purchase of stock, without her consent. (R 1932-36 §4.2.9(a)-(k), 1935 §4.2.9(±), 1939 §4.2.l2.)
Riley admitted that Donna Taylor's consent to the redemption of Taylor's shares was required.
(R 2166 ~53.) ALA sought and obtained her consent as required. (R 2177 §3.2.)

Donna Taylor's consent has nothing to do with the purported "fail-safe" clause. A review
of the agreements shows that ALA simply sought her consent and gave her additional concessions

36
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that Taylor

received security interests with no conditions proves the "fail-safe" is fundamentally flawed and
that the entire redemption was illegal. (ld.; R 2166-67, 2172-2215.) Judge Brudie explained,
"AlA could prevent Reed Taylor from ever having a legal remedy for non-payment of the $6
million Note by leaving as little as one cent unpaid on the debt owed to Donna Taylor. Such an
interpretation would result in a legal absurdity." (R 1273.) Judge Brudie rejected all of Riley's
arguments, including the Culp and Blickenstqtr cases that Riley cites on appeal. (R 1234-37.)
Those cases do not apply because their premise is that both parties are actually creditors, as
Taylor is allegedly owed a "contingent obligation." Notably, when Taylor and his ex-wife signed
the 2006 subordination agreement, both of their respective debts had matured and AlA had
intentionally not paid either of them. Judge Brudie's holding that Taylor and his ex-wife could
enter into the subordination agreement was consistent with I.e. § 30-1-640(6). (R 1232-37.)
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle assert that "Taylor proximately caused his own damages."
Although they have waived any arguments as to proximate cause because they have failed to cite
any authority, it is well-settled that "[t]he question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost
always for the jury." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,875,204 P.3d 508 (2009). A plaintiff need
only show that he had "some chance of success." Jordan, 135 Idaho at 590. However, Judge
Brudie already rejected Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's arguments on the subordination issue and
Taylor obtained partial summary judgment of the default of the $6M Note. (R 1174-90, 1232-
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The TriBar guidelines are instructive. They provide:
An opinion the opinion preparers believe to be misleading should not be delivered
until disclosures are made to cure the problem ... When considering if an opinion
to be given will mislead the opinion recipient, opinion preparers must think not
only about the opinion itself but also about areas excluded from the opinion ... The
question the opinion preparers must consider is whether under the circumstances
the opinion will cause the opinion recipient to misevaluate the specifie opinion.

TriBar II, 56 Bus. Law. at 602-03. Significantly, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle never disclosed the
"fail safe" or "subordination"

in the opinion letter. (R 824-28, 2873, p. 140.) Taylor

could not know that he should not enter into the subordination agreement with his ex-wife if he
had never been advised about the "fail-safe" clause. As MeDermott opined:
[T]he defendants' assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was
legal because certain payments were subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor is
not supported by any provision in I.e. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-2 ... There are no
disclosures, assumptions, qualifications or exceptions in the Opinion Letter that
insulate Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow or Eberle Berlin from any of the incorrect
opinions or their failure to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in a nonnegligent manner. Indeed, if the Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on
the so-called "fair value" test or some other analysis to which Mr. Riley has
testified to justify the compliance with I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995), rather than the plain
language of that statute, a reasonable opinion recipient would have insisted on a
shareholder vote to permit the use of capital surplus and thus avoid any ambiguity
or uncertainty with respect to the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement.
(R 3385-86

~~e-f;

App. B, p. 7-9

~~e-f.)

Thus, the opinion letter was misleading because it

contained no reasoning with respect to the "fail-safe" clause. Tri Bar II, 56 Bus. Law. at 602-03.
F. The Illegality Doctrine Does Not Apply.
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order granting the permissive appeal. Rountree, 296 P.3d at 376; ForIe, 153 Idaho at 866. (R
1866-90,

16-29,2556-71.) Turnbow and Eberle did not join in Riley's illegality argument.

The illegality doctrine does not apply. The Court has already ruled the stock redemption
agreement was hoth illegal and unenforceable. Taylor, 151 Idaho 552. "The [illegality J doctrine
normally applies as a common law defense against a party seeking to enforce an illegal contract."
v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 9, 56 P.3d 765 (2002). "This rule applies on the ground of public

policy to every contract which is founded on a transaction prohibited by statute." Id. at 6.
However, "when a plaintiff can maintain his cause of action without the aid of an illegal act or an
illegal agreement, he will be entitled to recover." Trees, 138 Idaho at 9; McConnon v. Holden, 35
Idaho 75, 204 P. 656,657 (1922).
Here, the opinion letter was not an illegal instrument nor was it an illegal act. Taylor is
not seeking to enforce the stock redemption agreement. (R 41-43,824-28,1685,2567-70,338486.) Taylor's claims are based on the incOlTect opinion letter and advice contained in the letter.
Id. The opinion letter wrongly advised Taylor that the redemption did not violate any laws and

that all necessary shareholder consent had been obtained. Id. Riley's duties Taylor through the
opinion letter arose "out of the contract between [Riley] and [AIA]"-which is not an illegal
contract. Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 137. As this Court explained in Buxton when the attorneys
there made a similar argument to Riley's, "[t]he contract between the City and its current
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arrangement

Riley, T'urnbow,

and

AlA to provide the opinion letter to Taylor was not illegal. And as in Buxton, there is no public
policy prohibiting Taylor from tiling a lawsuit here aner that opinion letter turned out to be
wrong. Simply put, there was nothing illegal about Riley, Turnbow and Eberle providing Taylor
an opinion letter. Just like there is nothing illegal about Taylor suing them because the opinion
letter was incorrect. It would be illogical and against public policy for Riley, Turnbow and
Eberle to avoid liability for malpractice under these circumstances. Farrell v. Whiteman, 146
Idaho 604, 612, 200 P.3d 1153 (2008). The transaction to redeem Taylor's shares should have
been legal, which distinguishes this case from the facts of other eases. As McDermott explained:
As general counsel for AlA Services Corporation, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin were in a position to see to it that all applicable legal requirements were
complied with for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares ...
As general counsel for AlA ... Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin had two
opportunities, prior to closing, to have the shareholders of AlA ... authorize an
amendment to the articles of incorporation to authorize the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares by authorizing the use of capital surplus as permitted by I.C. § 301-6. As general counsel for AlA ... Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin had two
opportunities, prior to closing, to have the shareholders vote on shareholder
resolutions authorizing the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the use of
capital surplus as permitted by I.C. § 30-1-6.
Indeed, if the Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on the so-called "fair
value" test or some other analysis to which Mr. Riley has testified to justifY the
compliance with I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995), rather than the plain language of that
statute, a reasonable opinion recipient would have insisted on a shareholder vote
to permit the use of capital surplus and thus avoid any ambiguity or uncertainty
with respect to the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement.
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potential violation ofLC. § 30-1-6." Taylor, 151 Idaho at 565, 567.

Riley is trying to do exactly what the illegality doctrine prohibits--derive a benefit from
the illegal stock redemption agreement. "IOlne not a party to an illegal contract cannot, as a
general rule, derive any benefit from the contract." Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 400, 49
P.3d 402 (2002). Riley, Turnbow and Eberle would obtain an improper benefit from the illegal
1995 stock redemption agreement if they were permitted to avoid liability for wrongly advising
Taylor to enter into the transaction. It would be absurd to empower attorneys to advise clients or
non-clients to enter into illegal transactions knowing that the attorneys could rely on the illegality
doctrine to avoid malpractice. Also, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's obligations to Taylor through
the opinion letter can be severed from the illegal transaction. Farrell, 146 Idaho at 611.
Riley relies upon the wrong defense. In the context of a legal malpractice action, the "in

pari delicto defense" was adopted in Idaho in Sohn, 125 Idaho at 171. In that case, the district
court applied the defense to dismiss Sohn's malpractice claim against Foley because it was based
on a "scheme" to defraud Sohn's ex-wife out of an insurance policy. !d. The Idaho Court of
Appeals reversed and ruled that it was for the trier of fact to determine whether Sohn's intent
was to deprive his ex-wife of the insurance policy through fraud./d. at 171-72.
The application of the in pari delicto defense applies to instances of fraud or perjury,
which are not present here. See Sohn, 125 Idaho at 171; Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329
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30-1-6." Taylor, 151 Idaho at 567. Judge Brudie,

Judge Greenwood, and this Court have never made a determination whether Taylor's malpractice
claims based on the opinion letter were barred by the in pari delicto defense. Such analysis
fundamentally differs from the analysis pertaining to the enforcement of an illegal redemption
agreement. Tay/or, 151 Idaho at 566.
In 201

Riley admitted that Taylor did not use his majority interest to effectuate a

preferential transaction for himself. (R 2684.) Riley also testified that he based the opinions in
the letter on the "fair value," and other purported reasons-none of which were reasoned in the
opinion letter nor ever disclosed to Taylor. (R 2861, p. 90,2873, p. 138-41,3384,3386.) Taylor
had no knowledge of the illegality and relied heavily on the opinion letter. (R 362 n. 15,813-19.)
Indeed, Riley's attorney billed an entry on October 30, 2010: "Analysis of whether deposition of
Riley, if allowed could be used in underlying case currently on appeal." (R 2774.) Finally,
Taylor's independent counsel (who Taylor also asserted claims against),2o testified that neither
he nor Taylor knew the redemption violated any laws and that he would have advised Taylor not
to sell his shares if he knew any laws were violated. (R 13 99-1400, 1895-1911.) Thus, it would
be futile to allow Riley to even assert this defense on remand. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 847.

G. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees.
20 Taylor waived all attorney-client privilege with Scott Bell and Cairncross and produced their files in their
entirety to Riley, Turnbow and Eberle.
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v. Miller, 1

).

Idaho 382,

387, 17 P.3d 883 (200 I). Moreover, Turnbow and Eberle failed to provide any argument as to
what commercial transaction or relationship supported their request.
The Court already found that the redemption of Taylor's shares was a commercial
transaction, but it refused to award fees because: "fwlhile both parties' claims are based upon the
commercial relationship between them, neither party should be permitted to claim the benefit of

I.C § 12-120(3)." Taylor, 151 Idaho at 574. Riley, and presumably Turnbow and Eberle, rely on
that same illegal commercial transaction between Taylor and AlA for their request for fees.
However, in order to be awarded fees for a malpractice action, "a commercial transaction [must
have] occurred between the prevailing party and the party from whom that pmiy seeks fees."

Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman P.A., 154 Idaho 21, _,293 P.3d 645,650 (2013). In
addition, fees may be awarded "as long as a commercial transaction is at the center of the
lawsuit." Id. However, "[t]he commercial transaction was illegal." Taylor, 151 Idaho at 574. (R
351-365,2172-2223.) Riley, Turnbow and Eberle are not entitled to fees, as also noted by Judge
Brudie in lvfcNichols when Riley requested fees under I.C § 12-120(3). !d. (R 758 n. 3.) Riley,
Turnbow and Eberle are barred from being awarded fees because "[o]ne not a party to an illegal
contract cannot, as a general rule, derive any benefit from the contract." Carrol, 137 Idaho at
400. They improperly seek to benefit from the illegal stock redemption agreement. Id.
For Riley, Turnbow and Eberle to avail themselves of the right to request fees under I.e.
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is owed to

is "no

Riley,

Turnbow. Eberle and Taylor they "are not entitled to attorney fees under I.e. § 1 120(3)."
!:'mp'rs Mut. Cas. Co, v. Donnelly, 154 Idaho 499, _,300 P.3d 31,38 (2013).
Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's request for fees is also premature because the appeal

IS

permissive and "any determination of the prevailing party is premature until the case is finally
resolved." Buxton, 146 Idaho at 667. Riley actually concedes this point. Moreover, Taylor could
still pursue a motion for reconsideration on other issues on remand. See l.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2). Even
ifthey were entitled to tees, the issue is one for remand.
H.

Ta~r S~..QJ!I!!JJe Award~!lAttornerr F~es

and Costs on Appeal.

This Court should reserve an award of attorney fees to Taylor on appeal for a
determination on remand pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3). Attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant
to I.C. § 12-120(3) for a legal malpractice action when there is a commercial relationship
between parties or the claims are based on a commercial transaction. Reynolds, 293 P.3d at 650;
Donnelly, 300 P.3d at 38.
Taylor asserts that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle owed him duties through the opinion letter
and that letter was created through a legal commercial relationship and/or commercial
transaction between them and AlA. (R41-43, 824-28,1685,1709,2567-70,3385-86; App. A-B,
p. 8-9.) Buxton, 146 Idaho at 666; Soingnier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 332, 326, 256 P.3d 730
(2011) ("the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in an action
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Taylor asserts that he should also be awarded fees for the illegal commercial transaction
betwecn hc and AlA bccause Riley, Turnbow and Eberle acted in the dual role of being general
counsel for AlA and the authors of the opinion letter to Taylor. (R 824, 3384
'f~c-d;

~~c-d;

App. B, p. 7

App. A, p. I.) N Bulle Alin. Co., 4 F.Supp. at 713 ("It is of an ancient maxim that general

counsel cannot thus delegate his duties of skill and discretion by the corporation delegated to
him"). It was not illegal for AlA to repurchase Taylor's shares. It was only illegal because a
shareholder resolution was not obtained by Riley, Turnbow and Eberle-AlA's general counsel
and the authors of the opinion letter. ld;

I.e.

§ 30-1-6. (R 824; App. A, p. 1.) In other words, the

transaction to redeem Taylor's shares should have complied with I.e. § 30-1-6 and should have
been legal and enforceable, which distinguishes the present case from other illegal transactions.

Taylor, 151 Idaho at 574; I.C. § 30-1-6. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle would derive a benefit from
their negligent work for the redemption if they were permitted to avoid paying Taylor's fees.

Carrol, 137 Idaho at 400. (R 824-28; App. A.) Moreover, awarding fees to Taylor would be
consistent with ensuring that an injured party receives "the difference between the client's actual
recovery and the recovery which should have been obtained but for the attorney's malpractice."

Sohn, 125 Idaho at 172; Buxton, 146 Idaho at 666. It would be inequitable and against public
policy to allow Riley, Turnbow and Eberle to avoid paying Taylor's attorneys' fees for their
malpractice. Jd.; Farrell, 146 Idaho at 612. However, it is premature for this Court to award fees
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reserve an
him costs. I

40(a).

This Court should af11rm Judge Greenwood's ruling that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle
owed duties to Taylor through all of the correct theories. Riley, Turnbow and Eberle's other
arguments fai l.

Attorneys

TaY~Qr'sj;eqbest

for fees should be reserved for remand and award him costs.

I
Gaffney PA
the Respondent, Reed 1. Taylor
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Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501
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r
r

Re:

""""1.0*_

~

"''"''"......

..."

1

Common Stock. Redemption

Dear Mr. Taylor:

\

J

t
\

This opinion is being de1iven:d to you PUl'SUIUlt to SeedOR 2.50) of tile Stock Redemption
Ap!:ement dated July 22, 1995 ( •AareementM) by and between AlA Services CorporatIon. an
Idaho corporation (·Company") and Reed 1. Taylor. All capitalized term. not deftned herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the ~ The phrase "1'mnIaction
Documents· refers collectively to the Apment. togetber with the Note, the Pledge Asrament.
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Apement and the Noncompedtion Agreement, as such
documents are defi~ in tbe Ag1'eeI11eJ'\t.
•-

[

[

l.

We have acted as general counsel tor the Company in connectioll with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. AI such general counsel, we bave assisted in the neaotlation.
and have eutni.ned executed counterparts (or pbosostatic copies of executed counlerplU'tl) of the _
Agreement and other Transaction Documents.

In addition, we have examJned oriJinals, executed counterpam or copies Df $Ucb
agreements, corporate recorda, instmment& and certificates, cet1ificatcs of public authorities and
s\jCb matters of law as we bav. deomod ~ for tho purpose of renderinB the opinions set
forth berein. To the extent we ckemed necessary for the purposes of this opinion, we hav.
relied upon (1) the smtements and tepreSenIations of tlte Company as to factual matCorI, (ii) the
corporate records provided to us by the Company. and (iil) oertificates and othet documents
obtained from public of'flc:ials. We hav. further JeIied as to factual matters on tho repzesentadoas
and wamutties containe4 in tbe ~ and the other ~ft Documents (incI~.
without limitation, Mr. Tlylor's reptesetttations hi AttieIe IV of the ~) and on the
Company's repzesentations in Schedule m (a1tadle4) to tha Agreement; and '" have assumed
tho compJetene.ss and aceuracy of' all such repfesentations and ~ as to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness at alllj~ (other tban thOse 01 the Company). the!ep!
capacity of Mr. Ta.ylor to execute the Agreement and aU otber documeIlfI we hav. reviewed,
the authenticity of aU documents submitted to liS as orialnab. and the conformity to oriainal
documents of all documents submitted to us as ccrti1ied, photostati.e. ~UC*f or conformed
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other TranlllCtion Documents have
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Auaust 1S, 1995
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been duly autborlzed, eucuted and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceab1o aplnst him in
accordance with their respective ttIrDU, and that the execution. delivery and performance of the.
.Agn!ement and the otbor Transactlon Documents by Mr. Ta)'~or does not and wUlaot ruult in
a breach of, orC01Ultitutudefaultunder,81lY~instrurndorotbwdocumenttowbJch
Mr. Taylor is a partyI or any order. judgment. writ or decree applicable to _ party to wldch
Mr. Taykrs property is s u b j e c t . ·

~ts

[

l

Whenever our opinion with respect to tho existence or absence of
is indicated to be
based on our bowledg., we are referdna to the adUa1 knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley I who are tho sole attorneys ill Eberle, BerIiI1, K'adins. Turnbow "McIOveen.
Chartered who have represented the Company dutil'll the come of our ~0Jl itt·this
transaction. Except as expressly Jet forth herem, we have not undertaken all)' i.ndepaIdent lepI
or factual invesdaatioll to determine the exlstem:e or absence of such Cacts. and 110 infmeqce as
to 0IIt knowledge of the existence or l~ of suc& facts should be drawn from such
rep~.

Based upon and subject 10 our examination and assumptions 8$ aforesaid and subject to
the qualifteations heMinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in tho
attached Schedule m and/or the Schedules attached 10 the A,Jreement:

1.
The Company is a corporation duly oraaniztId and validJ)' existlns under
the laws of the Stare of Idaho. Bated solely on the attached Certificatll of' CorporaI8 Statui
issued by the Idaho SccretaTy of State, the CompanY. The Universe Life Insumnce Company
(·Universe"), All.. Insurance, Inc. (" AlAIW) and Parmea Healtb Alliance Administrators, ItIC.
("Farmers·) are corporations incorporaled under the corporation. laws of the State of Idaho and
in good stand1ns on the records of the Idaho SecreIaty of State.
.
2.
The Company and its SubsIdiaries have full corporate power and autbority
enter into, execute and deliver the TransactiOlll Documents and to perform their teapedive
obliptions thereunder; ali corporate action on the part of Company and its Subsidiaries, aDd
their teSpCICdve directors and shareholders. neceaary for the autborl2aHon. execution, delivery
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaetion Documents and tho
consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Tratlsaction
Documents have beeIJ duly executed and delivered by Company and Its Subsidiaries. 'The
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and its
ubsidiaries enforceable apinst them in accordance with their respective terms, except that
enforceability may be limited by <a) applicable ban1auptcy, insolvency, moratorium,
reorganlzatlon, fraudulent transfer, receivership. conservatorsbip or similar Jaws affecting
creditor's rights
(b) the ox«else of judicial discretioc ilt accordance with gcnetal
principles of equity (wbether applied by a court of law or equity) and (e) conliderations of public
10

aeoerany.

-2..
Appendix A • Page - 2

000825

\
\
-

._--,--,-"

Reed J. TaxIsr _ .,.
August 15, 1995
Page 3

L

pelicy.

r

Documents~

3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the 'l"1InsIIction
Company and its Subsidiarle&, nor tbe consummation of tho 1nUl1llCtlonl contemplated therebyt
win (a) conflict with or vioJate any provWon of tbeit mPecciw Articles of lncorporatioa or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a vtoIadOD or default UDder any indebted.... Indeatute,
mortgqe, deed of trust, note, bond, lIc:ease, lease asroemeot. or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of Its a.aeta
or tho aaets of its Subaldiarl.e.& may be subject; or (0) to the best of our knowJedae, violate any
law. rule, license, resulation, judgment, order. ruling. or deme, fncIudina any iDlU13ftCl'laws
or reguJatiODa of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of ita SUbsidiarlea are SDbject.,
gow:min& or affectina the operation of CbmpaIlJ or its 8ubsidia.tie1 in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaotioll Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries. nor the consummation of the It'lmIadiona contemplated thereby. will CODStltutc an
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceIeJ:ation of any indebtedness
ot the Company ot odler liability. with or without notict or 1apa ot lime, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the eon.ata!.

l

allyl

4.
No consent, authorization. approval or exemption by, or f1l1ns witl1.
Person or any Governmental Authority. is requited in connection with tho execution, delivery and
pufonnancc by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taking of
any action contemplated thereby I except such as haw been obtaLned prior to. Closlna.

D

5.

All of the currently outstanding Ptedpd Sbarel ate owned beno.ficiallyand

of record by Company and. to lbe best of our ImowIedFt lbere are no warranu, options. or

other tights to purchase such Pledged Shares.
6.
Bxcept for the lien of First [nterstate Lien upcB tb6 First Interstate Shares.
and any interest in the Commission colJateral created or granted In favor of The Centennial We
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dateci August 11, 1995
among TIle CenIeoniai Life Insurance Company~ AlA Services Corporation. AlA I~
Inc., The Universe Life InsuratlCe Company and AlA MidAmerlea. Inc., lb. CoU.atetal is free
and clear of all pledges, liena, encumbrances, !CCUlity intenllt&. equities, claims. or
Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and F'armtn to
Sharchoid« at Closing. Shareholder shall have at ClOling a porfoctcd first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.

options.l

[

7:
To our knowledge. there are no claims, actions, SUits, proceedInp or
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of itl Subsidiaries,
at law or in equity before or by any Oovernmental Authority, nor has any such action, .suil,

-3
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prooeed1ng or investigation been ~ during the three-year period p.rececIins the date hereof.

Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiarloa is in defiwlt with ~ to any acIjudiadOry order.
writ, il\f1mction or decree oIlIlJ Governmen1al81ltbority. and neidt« Company nor an)' of its
Subsidlarles Is a party to any ClIII86 and desist ontcr. supeMaory qreeme:nt or arrangement.
conseusuaI or otherwise. with any Governmental Authority.

1

~

r

The foregoing opinions are iindted to tbe laws and regulations of the State of
_clbding the principles of conf1ictI of laws); and we have not comideted and expressed no
opinion on the laws ot rqulations of any other jurildiction. This' opinion is rende:ed only with
respect to the laws and tile rules, regulationa and orders (excludina tho prinGipJas of cordctI
of !aws) of Jhe State 01 Idaho that are in effect II of the date hereof. Ws assume no
reaponsibUity fot updating this opinion to 1:IJce into account any event. action. int.e:rpretadon or
change of Jaw OCCUJ'.I'b)g subsequent to tbe date bereof that may affect the validity of an)' of the

opinions exp1:ested berein.
The ent'orceabUity opinion expressed in opinion
following additional qualifications:

12

Qf this letter is subject to the

(i)
The terms of any commission agreement. 1ockbox qreement Of other
account agreement wbich may affect the Commission Collattmll. the rlsbts of the parties
(other than Company Of any of its Subsidiaries) to any 5UCb ~ and an)' claim
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such asreeme.nt.
(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, ot be limited. by applicable Idafto
laws or judicial cIecbions g<wemill8 such rlsbts. temedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of sucb rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity ot enforceability of other
provisions of the Transaction Documeau and, ill the event the Company or any of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents. :Mr.

Taylor may exercise remedies that would normally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and :Mr. Taylor proeeeds in accordance with
such law.
(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection ot the rdldve
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in the Commission COllaceraJ.

\
-1./ \
I
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1'bis opinion 11 fumlsbed by ua solely for your benetlt for use fa cormection with the
Transacdon .DocumentJ and the transactions con!emplated thereby; and it may not be furnished
or quoted to, or retied upon, by any other person.
Very truly your&,

-~
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MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY. ISB No. 3558
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Sl
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Tel: (208) 557-5203
Fax: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC
800 BeUewe Way NE, Suite 400
Bellevue, WA 98004
Tel: (425) 591-6903
Fax: (425) 321-0343
Email: rod@roderickbond.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNI'Y OF ADA
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868

Plaintiff,
EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD T. McDERMOIT

v.
RICHARD A RILEY, an individual;
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnersbip;
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Robert M
Turnbow, and EBERLE. BERLIN, KADING,
TURNBOW & MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED,

an Idaho corporation;
Defendants.
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STA TE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ULSTER

)
) ss:
)

I, Richard T. McDenuott, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testity in court, and make this

Affidavit upon my personal knowledge, experience and education.
2.

In 1962, I received a B.A. from Marquette University. In 1966, I obtained a J.D.

from Fordham University School of Law.

3.

In 1967, I was admitted to practice law in the State of New York. I am presently

in good standing and licensed to practice law in the State of New York. I have been admitted to
practice law in New York for over 45 years.
4.

I am a member of the New York State Bar Association Securities Regulation

Committee.

5.

From 1966 through 1990, I was an Associate and Partner with the law firm of

Alexander & Green/Walter Conston Alexander & Green (the finus combined). From 1990
through 2004, I was a Partner of Rogers & Wells/Clifford Chance LLP (the firms merged in
2000). While at that firm, I chaired the Legal Personnel Committee, and was responsible for the
training, development, evaluation and advancement of associate attorneys and counsel, as well as
being involved in the partner selection process.
6.

From 2000 through the present time, I have been an Adjunct Professor at

Fordham University School of Law. From 1980 through 1998, I was an Adjunct Professor at
New York University School of Law. In both positions, I taught law school classes on the Legal

EXPERT WITNESS AFFfDAVIT OF RICHARD T. McDER1\10TT - 2
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Aspects of Corporate Finance, and covered such subjects as debentures, indentures, preferred
stock, convertible securities, dividends and stock repurchases as well as third party opinions in
corporate transactions.
7.

I am the co-author of Chapters 1 and 2 (Introduction and Elements of Opinion

Letters, respectively) and author of Chapter 3 (Legal Opinions on Corporate Matters) of the
Treatise: LEGAL OPINION LEITERS A Comprehensive Guide to Opinion Practice (Third
Edition).
8.

I have been a member of the TriBar Opinion Committee for twenty-two years.

The TriBar Opinion Committee is a nationally recognized committee that publishes Reports on
various aspects of opinion practice.
9.

I am the author of Legal Aspects of Corporate Finance (4 th ed. 2006) and 2010-

2012 Supplements thereto, which is published by LexisNexis Matthew Bender; it is my
understanding that the book has been used at twenty-two law schools. I am presently working on
the Fifth Edition of that book, which is expected to be published early in 2013.
10.

I have authored other articles and materials (including a Teacher's Manual for

Legal Aspects of Corporate Finance).
11.

In 1988, I was a visiting lecturer at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia

and the University of Adelaide, Australia, Corporate and Business Law Centre. In 1999, I colectured with former Delaware Chancellor William Allen and James Fuld, author of Legal

Opinions In Business Transactions - An Attempt to Bring Some Order Out of Some Chaos, 28
Bus. Law. 915 (1973), on the Law and Business of Investment Banking at the New York

EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDA VIT OF RICHARD T. McDERMOTT - 3
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University Center for Law and Business.
12.

From 2009 through the present time, I have served as a Special Master for the

New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, First Department.
13.

I have extensive experience in domestic and international corporate finance,

mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, strategic alliances, bankruptcy reorganizations and other
corporate matters. I have experience in the preparation of Proxy Statements and Reports to
shareholders and the preparation of reports tiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
14.

I have prepared, delivered or approved over 100 opinion letters in my career. I

also served on the Committee that approved opinion letters at my prior law firm.
15.

I have never acted as an expert witness in a case against an attorney or a law firm.

16.

I have consulted with Winston V. Beard, an attorney licensed to practice in Idaho

with experience preparing and delivering opinion letters, regarding the standard of care in Idaho
for attorneys preparing opinion letters.
17.

I have reviewed the deposition transcripts of Richard A. Riley and Stanley Tharp,

together with the exhibits thereto. I have reviewed certain Affidavits of Reed Taylor and Scott
Bell. I have reviewed certain pleadings and papers tiled in this action and the underlying action,
including, without limitation, the recent affidavits of Richard Riley, D. John Ashby, Julianne
Hall and Loren Ispsen, together with the exhibits thereto, and the Memorandums tiled by the
defendants in support of their pending motions for summary judgment.

r have also reviewed the

Stock Redemption Agreement, $6 Million Promissory Note, Security Agreement, Stock Pledge
Agreement, shareholder and board meeting minutes, amended articles of incorporation

EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDA VIT OF RICHARD T. McDERMOTT - 4
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(including both versions filed in 1995), and other documents provided to me by Reed Taylor's
counsel.
18.

I have reviewed the applicable Rules and Commentaries in the Idaho Rules of

Professional Conduct effective November I, 1986 and July 1, 2004 (in both versions, Idaho
acknowledges that a duty mayor may not be owed by an attorney providing an evaluation to a
third party. See RPC 2.3 and Comments thereto.) I have also reviewed a number of authorities
and decisions, including, without limitation,

I.e. § 30-1-6 (1995); I.C. § 30-1-2 (1995); I.e. § 30-

1-46 (1995); the TriBar Reports; the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers; Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer and Wood, 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.
2d 318 (1992); Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 261 P.3d 829 (2011); Taylor v.
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010).
19.

I have read Judge Brudie's decisions tlnding the redemption illegal and denying

Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration in the underlying case. I have also reviewed Judge
Greenwood's decision tlnding that Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow owed Reed Taylor a duty of care.
20.

I have reviewed the Opinion Letter prepared and delivered to Reed Taylor by the

defendants in this action, together with the attached exceptions and Certificates of Corporate
Status. The Opinion Letter acknowledges, without exception, that Riley, Turnbow and Eberle
Berlin were general counsel for AIA Services Corporation. The Opinion Letter is addressed to
Reed Taylor and speciflcally invited his reliance by limiting him as the only party who may rely
upon the Opinion Letter. The Opinion Letter contains several opinions customary in transactions
such as the stock redemption, including, without limitation, that AlA Services Corporation had
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the power and authority to enter into the Stock Redemption Agreement, that all necessary actions
had been taken by shareholders and that the Stock Redemption Agreement constitutes the valid
and binding obligation of AlA Services Corporation, enforceable in accordance with its terms.
21.

My opinions set forth below are based upon Riley, Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin,

Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle Berlin") not being attorneys for Reed Taylor
in connection with the Stock Redemption Agreement and related matters, although I have
reviewed documents and testimony that indicate there was, at a minimum, a past joint and
concurrent attorney-client relationship between Rilely, Turnbow and other attorney(s) at Eberle
Berlin and Reed Taylor and AlA Services Corporation.
22.

Based upon my knowledge, education and/or experience, together with the

authorities and information [ have reviewed, assumed and disclosed above, [ make the following
opinions:
a.
atton'le~s

Courts in the United States have routinely imposed liability against

for preparing and delivering incorrect opinion letters to third parties. generally, these

claims are bused on some form of negl igence.

b.

As determined by Judge Brudie and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court,

the Opinion Letter wus materially incorrect since, among other things: (I) the Stock Redemption
Agreement vielated Idahe law (specifically

I.e.

§ 30 I 6); (2) AlA Services Cerporation did !!ill

have the cerporate po't't'er or authority to enter into the Stock Redemption Agreement; (3) all
necessary cerperate action ,,<'as !!ill taken by AlA Services Corporatien and its sharehelders te
fiutherize the execution delii>'er;' or performance b" AlA Services Corpomtion ef the Stock
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Redemption Agreement; Md (4) the Stock Redemption Agreement did !ill! constitute the valid
aRd biRding obligation of AJA Services (CorporatioR enforceable against it in accordMce ,tVith its

c.

As general counsel for AlA Services Corporation, Riley, Turnbow and

Eberle Berlin were in a position to see to it that all applicable legal requirements were complied
with for the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares of Common Stock of AlA Services Corporation.
d.

As general counsel for AlA Services Corporation, Riley, Turnbow and

Eberle Berlin had two opportunities, prior to closing, to have the shareholders of AlA Services
Corporation authorize an amendment to the articles of incorporation to authorize the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares by authorizing the use of capital surplus as permitted by I.C. § 30-1-6.
As general counsel for AlA Services Corporation, Riley, Turnbow and Eberle Berlin had two
opportunities, prior to closing, to have the shareholders vote on shareholder resolutions
authorizing the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the use of capital surplus as permitted by

I.e. § 30-1-6.
e.

:I=he defendants' assert arguments pertaining to the restructuring of the

redemption obligations t8 Reed Taylor in 1996 Md the alleged subordination of the payment of
the $6 MiilionN8te to the redemption of Donna Taylor's Series A Preferred Shares in AlA:
Services (Corporation. These arguments are irrelevMt. The relevant inquir;' is vihethef the
opini8ns rendcfed in the Opinion Lettef were accurate when the transaction to redeem Reed
Taylor's shares was closed. Since the transaction was not carried out in compliance with I.e. §
30-1-6 (1995), any subsequent restructuring or modification of the agreements and any
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subordination issues are irrelevant because the original transaction was illegal. In addition, the
defendants' assertions that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was legal because certain
payments were subordinate to payments to Donna Taylor is not supported by any provision in

I.e. § 30-1-6 or I.e. § 30-1-2.1

When the Opinion Letter wo:s delh/ered ffi: the time of closing, the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was either legal or not. In addition, the 1996 restrueture did
not affeet the $6 Million Promissory Note or the security interests relating thereto ('vvhieh v;ere
rendered unenfurceable by Judge Brudie's ruling and as affifffied b,' the Idaho SUf3reme Court).
The Opinion Letter remains in full furee and effeet.
f.

Mr. Riley and Mr. Turnbow, as the Opinion Letter preparers, and Eberle

Berlin, as the signatory of the Opinion Letter, owed and/or assumed a duty of care to Reed
Taylor to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in a non-negligent manner, which was to
prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter exercising the degree of care and skill that a reasonably
prudent opinion preparer would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Mr. Riley, Mr.
Turnbow and Eberle Berlin breached their duties owed to Reed Taylor when they failed to
exercise that required degree of care and skill thereby delivering to him an incorrect Opinion
Letter. There are no disclosures, assumptions, qualifications or exceptions in the Opinion Letter
that insulate Mr. Riley, Mr. Turnbow or Eberle Berlin from any of the incorrect opinions or their

I Under AlA Services Corporation's Articles of Amendment to the Articles ofIncorporation filed on April
1 L 1995 and August 3, 1995, respectively. AlA Services Corporation was authorized to redeem Donna Taylor's
shares using "legally available funds" and "only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business
Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares." S'ee Aliicle Fourth, Section 4.2.3.
Donna Taylor's shares were only redeemed as payments were made to her, unlike Reed Taylor's redemption in
which his shares were canceled and payments. instruments and security interests \,iere granted to him at the time of
the redemption. There are no provisions in AlA Services Corporation's Amendment of Amendment to the Articles
ofIncorporation authorizing the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
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failure to prepare and deliver the Opinion Letter in a non-negligent manner.

Indeed, if the

Opinion Letter had disclosed that it was based on the so-called "fair value" test or some other
analysis to which Mr. Riley has testified to justify the compliance with

I.e.

§ 30-1-6 (1995),

rather than the plain language of that statute, a reasonable opinion recipient would have insisted
on a shareholder vote to permit the use of capital surplus and thus avoid any ambiguity or
uncertainty with respect to the legality of the Stock Redemption Agreement?
g.

Reed Taylor has testified that he would not have permitted his shares to be

redeemed if the Opinion Letter had not been provided. Seott Bell testified that he would have
advised Reed Taylor not to sell his shares if the Opinion Letter had not been provided. Botk
Reed Taylor and Scott Bell's testimony is consistent with 8ection 2.58) ofthe 8tock Redemption
Agreement, ""'hich required the Opinion Letter to be delivered to Reed Taylor as a condition of
closing the redemption transaetion. As a result, Reed Taylor was prOldmately damaged when
Judge Brudie held that the Stock Redemption Agreement was illegal and unenforceable, which
rendered the $6 Million Promissory Note, plus accrued interest, and the security interests granted
to Reed Taylor as void and unenforceable obligations (which opiniofl was affirmed by the Idaho
Supreme Court).
h.

I rnn not a'v'f'are of any other instance in vthich an opinion giver'S law firm

has in effect dis6:'lowed his previously rendered third party opinions. This was done kere by Mr:
Riley's la'>', firm asserting in a judicial proceediHg that the Stock Redemption Agreement is

2 The obligations and duties owed by Riley. Turnbow and Eberle Berlin to Reed Taylor through the
preparation and delivery of the Opinion Letter have nothing to do with any alleged negligent acts of Scott Bell or
any other attorney at his firm.
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unenfuroeable and illegal, ootwithstandiag the opinions stating the direct opposite. :Moreov:er, the
opinion givers ignored requests to assist the reeipient of the opinion, Reed Taylor, in defending
the Steak Redemption Agreement against the eharge of illegality and enroreing it in aeoorclanee
'.vith its terms.
DATED: This 29th day of August, 2012.

,

~,4~~#-;!/
chard T. McDermott
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 29th day of August, 2

Notary Public for New Yor
Residing at:
Id lit ( A.l tj
My commission expires: _7_'-7_ _ __

tJlt,n

MAAIE BALOGH

NOTARY PUBUC, State of New York

No.01BA5076592

Qualified In Ulster Coun.tv /'JY\.. I. t:\Commiaalon Explrea AprlI21.12SJ,/. J
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date indicated below, I caused to be served true and
correct copies ofth·e foregoing document to the following parties:

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)

Jack S. Gjording
Julianne S. Hall
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 336-9177

Via:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Deli vered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement)

James D. LaRue
Loren C. Ipsen
Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704
Fax: (208) 384-5844
Signed this 30 th day of August, 2012.
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